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THE RISE AND DECLINE OF COIN-MACHINE GAMBLING
RUFUS KING
Mr. King is engaged in the practice of law in Washington, D. C. He has served as Counsel to sev-
eral congressional committees, including the Senate Crime Committee. In 1952, Mr. King drafted
the Model Anti-Gambling Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. From 1956 to 1959, he served as Chairman of the Joint Committee on Narcotic
Drugs of the American Bar Association and the American Medical Association and is a former
Chairman of the Criminal Law Section of the American Bar Association. He has contributed nu-
merous articles in the field of criminal law to leading law journals.
In the following article Mr. King traces the competing histories of coin-machine gambling and
legal efforts to suppress it in the United States. The author documents in detail the legislative acts
which have served to thwart coin-machine gambling and which sometimes have served to promote
it. He also appraises current indicia regarding the future prospects for coin-machine gambling in the
United States.-EDToR.
The forbears of automated gambling, coin-oper-
ated vending machines, made their appearance on
the American scene early in the nineteenth century.
For pennies or nickels they delivered candy, told
fortunes, freed turnstiles, weighed people, or re-
galed their patrons with marvelously complicated
piano-and-orchestra discordances.
In the 1890's two men, Charles Fey of San
Francisco and Herbert Stephen Mills of Chicago,
began the first important production of coin
gambling devices. Their machines, by adding an
element of chance and cash pay-outs to what
had theretofore been simple vending transactions,
brought the gambling-house proprietor into the
five-and-dime market. Their products won the
sobriquet "one-armed bandit," for the lure of their
fruit-laden reels proved irresistible. "No other
machine was ever invented from which the profits
derived were so fabulous on so small an invest-
ment, and with so little effort."' Great fortunes
were founded by those early connected with the
manufacture and operation of these devices.
Vending machines always have two functions,
akin to the traditional concept of bargain and
sale: they take the patron's coin as consideration
and, like the sales clerk behind his counter, they
deliver something in return. What they deliver is
of equal value each time,2 be it amusement (a
I Anonymous, Slot Machines and Pinball Gaines,
269 ANNALs 62 (1950).
- See White v. Hesse, 48 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
This provides, incidentally, one of the best and most
foolproof tests of gambling. Section 2(4) of the MODEL
ANi-n-GAMuBmNG AcT (Nat'l Conf. of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, 1952) defines a gambling de-
vice as "any device or mechanism which, when operated
for a consideration, does not return the same value or
juke box record or an arcade game), service (a
shoeshine or a telephone call), or merchandise
(a pack of cigarettes, etc.). Gambling machines
always have three functions: they receive the
consideration from the patron (who is now putting
up a stake, qua player); they apply some determi-
native element of chance in each transaction;
and they pay out, or control the paying out of,
winnings. Hence all gambling machine operations
embrace the three classic elements of the generic
definition of gambling, namely, consideration,
chance, and prize. 3
By the turn of the twentieth century most
American jurisdictions had reacted to variously
bitter experiences with lotteries and lottery
variants. 4 Over half the states had written anti-
lottery provisions directly into their constitutions,5
while Congress had been induced to take its first
fling into local law-enforcement provinces with a
postal ban on lottery tickets in 18906 and a corn-
thing of value for the same consideration upon each
operation thereof." Cf. N.C. GENz. STAT. §14-296
(1943); Calcutt v. McGeachy, 213 N.C. 1, 195 S.E.
49 (1938).
3 Johnson v. Phinney, 218 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1955);
State v. One "Jack and Jill" Pinball Machine, 224
S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App. 1949); Boles v. Bartell, 82
Ariz. 217, 310 P.2d 834 (1957); State v. Ricciardi,
32 N.J. Super. 204, 108 A.2d 111 (1954); Williams v.
State, 65 Ga. App. 843, 16 S.E.2d 769 (1941).
4 Blanche, Lotteries Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,
269 ANNALS 71 (1950). Homer v. United States, 147
U.S. 449 (1893); Ballock v. State, 73 Md. 1, 20 Atl.
184(1890).
5 See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. III, §33 (1867); FLA.
CoNsT. art. 3, §23 (1868); Nnv. CONST. art. IV, §24
(1869); CAM. CONsT. art. 4, §26 (1879).
6Act of Sept. 19, 1890, 26 Stat. 465, 18 U.S.C. §1302.
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merce-clause prohibition in 1895.7 Most states also
enacted general anti-gambling statutes in this
era, aimed at repressing other flourishing opera-
tions such as the "common gambling house," the
bucket shop, and the Victorian card sharp.
8
So the products of Fey and Mills and their
imitators began almost from the outset to en-
counter difficulties with state legislatures and local
law enforcement agencies-though for most of the
ensuing half century they frequently had the
better of their public adversaries. Sometimes they
prospered because no one troubled to observe the
magnitude of their five-cent-per-play operations.
With great ingenuity they kept ahead, step by
step as we shall see, of clumsy efforts to draft new
laws describing their devices with too much
particularity.9 Sometimes they benefited from
simple confusion between themselves and the
operators of vending or amusement machines.
But often their operations were the subject of
"arrangements" with local authorities, to whom
gambling money has never been as tainted as the
fruits of other vice enterprises.
And there was plenty of money to take care of
everyone. Once established in a populous territory
the slots could pull enough tribute from their
patronage to satisfy all who had their palms out-
and still leave handsome profits. Odds on the
classic machines usually were set at 60-40 in
favor of the operator, though they could be
adjusted merely by blocking teeth in their ratchets
and would produce nearly as well in good locations
at 75-25 or even 85-15. Active slots will take
upwards of twenty nickels (or dimes, or dollars)
per minute.
In their race to keep ahead of sheriffs and legis-
lative draftsmen, slots designers evolved subter-
fuges to conceal each of the three gambling func-
tions their machines had to perform. The standard
procedure, when each innovation reached the
market-and if and when local "arrangements"
broke down-was to apply to the local courts for
injunctions against seizure, and then to flood the
territory with the questioned device while slots
Act of March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 963, 18 U.S.C. §1301.
See France v. United States, 164 U.S. 676 (1897);
Francis v. United States, 188 U.S. 375 (1903).
8 Bauman & King, A Crilkal Analysis of the Gam-
bling Laws, in ABA Comm'N ON ORoAmzED CmE,
ORGANIzED CRIME AND LAW ENIFORCEmENT 75-112
(1952).
' See, e.g., Franklin, J., dissenting in McCall v.
State, 161 Pac. 893, 899 (Ariz. 1916).
lawyers dragged out each step of appellate re-
view.10
As might thus be expected, there is a great
accumulation of judicial literature on this subject,"
and some of the older opinions are remarkably
obscure. Courts were split long ago, for example,
on whether attaching a small mint vendor to the
side of a one-armed bandit, so it would vend
candy every time it was played, effectively con-
verted it into a bona fide vending machine (since
it then returned some consideration for each coin) .12
In lieu of cash pay-offs the machines were
designed to give tokens (conspicuously marked,
"not redeemable"); 13 the tokens were adapted to
fit the coin chute so it could be argued they were
merely free replays "for amusement only"; 14 some
models issued tickets or checks on which were
printed pay-off values (so it could be insisted the
paper itself was not a "thing of value");15 mints
and gum from the vendor adaptation were de-
livered in variously colored wrappers keyed to
pay-offs; 16 and one type merely indicated bow
10 For the chronicle of one "active" state, see Griste
v. Burch, 112 S.C. 369, 99 S.E. 703 (1919); Harvie v.
Heise, 150 S.C. 277, 148 S.E. 66, appeal dismissed,
279 U.S. 822, 824, 876 (1929); Durant v. Bennett,
54 F.2d 634 (W.D.S.C. 1931); State v. Kizer, 164
S.C. 383, 162 S.E. 444 (1932); Alexander v. Martin,
192 S.C. 176, 6 S.E.2d 20 (1939); Alexander v. Hunni-
cut, 196 S.C. 364, 13 S.E.2d 630 (1941); Cannon v.
Odom, 196 S.C. 371, 13 S.E.2d 633 (1941); Ingram v.
Beardon, 212 S.C. 399, 47 S.E.2d 833 (1948); Ringstaff
v. Evans, 212 S.C. 411, 47 S.E.2d 838 (1948); Holliday
v. Governor of South Carolina, 78 F. Supp. 918
(W.D.S.C.), a/'d, 335 U.S. 803 (1948); State v. Lang-
ley, 236 S.C. 583, 115 S.E.2d 308 (1960).
"1 See, e.g., Annotations at 38 A.L.R. 73, 60 A.L.R.
343, 81 A.L.R. 177, 730, 85 A.L.R. 622, 101 A.L.R.
1126, 132 A.L.R. 1004, 135 A.L.R. 104, 138 A.L.R.
834, 19 A.L.R.2d 1238.
12 Gardner v. Daugherty, 10 F.2d 373 (D. Mich.
1925); White v. Hesse, 48 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1931);
Mills Novelty Co. v. United States, 50 F.2d 476 (Ct. Cl.
1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 547 (1932); Boynton v.
Ellis, 57 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1932); Mills Novelty Co. v.
Farrell, 64 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1933); Davies v. Mills
Novelty Co., 70 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1934).
13 Colbert v. Sup. Confection Co., 154 Okla. 28, 6 P.
2d 791 (1932); Kirk v. Morrison, 108 Fla. 144, 146 So.
215 (1933).
'1 State ex rd. Manchester v. Marvin, 211 Iowa 462,
233 N.W. 486 (1930); State v. Mint Vending Machine
No. 195084, 85 N.H. 22, 154 AtI. 224 (1931); Painter
v. State, 163 Tenn. 627, 45 S.W.2d 46 (1932); Rankin
v. Mills Novelty Co., 182 Ark. 561, 32 S.W.2d 161
(1930).
11 Moberly v. Deskin, 169 Mo. App. 672, 155 S.W.
842 (1913); United States v. Brown, 267 Ky. 602, 102
S.W.2d 382 (1936); Harvey v. United States, 214 F.
Supp. 80 (D. Ore. 1962).
16 See Ad-Lee Co. v. Meyer, 294 Pa. 498, 144 At.
540 (1929); Drzatga, Gambling and the Law-Slot
Machines, 43 J. CIbu. L., C. & P.S. 114, 116 (1952).
[Vol. 55
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF COIN-MACHINE GAMBLING
much the player had won, requiring deposit of the
next coin to drop his winnings (to ground the
contention that there was no chance since the
value to be received for each coin was determined
before it was inserted)." Sometimes the pay-off
code was concealed in colored cards bearing
horoscopes, humorous sayings, etc.,18 and some-
times the machine simulated vendors by paying
in cigars, cigarettes, golf balls, and other mer-
chandise items.'9
Machines were marketed with no coin slot: the
player paid the location owner20 to push a remote
control, setting up his plays (to defeat the applica-
tion of statutes which specified "coin-operated"
devices)*21 And pay-off games appeared in various
guises in connection with mechanisms requiring
modest skill to operate, to provoke solemn delibera-
tions on the question whether they thus ceased to
incorporate the prohibited chance principle."
(Bona fide awards for skill, as in the classic turkey
shoot and its coin-operated simulations, are not
gambling;23 but if skill actually determines the
Cf. Tooley v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 162 (D. Nev.
1955).
17 Gardner v. Daugherty, 10 F.2d 373 (D. Mich.
1925); Zaft v. Milton, 96 N.J. Eq. 576, 126 AtI. 29
(1924); Commonwealth v. McClintock, 257 Mass.
431, 154 N.E. 264 (1926); State v. Apodaca, 32 N.M.
80, 251 Pac. 389 (1926).
United States v. Brown, 156 F. Supp. 121 (N.D.
Iowa 1957). See Rouse v. Sisson, 190 Miss. 276, 199
So. 777 (1941).
1" Ex parle Pierotti, 43 Nev. 243, 184 Pac. 209 (1919);
Ex parte Williams, 87 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1906); State v.
Sparks, 48 Ga. App. 498, 173 S.E. 216 (1934); and,
during World War II, in ration tokens! State v. Rand,
238 Iowa 250, 25 N.W.2d. 800 (1947).
0 It is important to bear in mind that virtually all
coin-operated devices-gambling, amusement, vend-
ing, etc.-are owned by operators, who then place them
in locations where the public has access, splitting the
profits with the location owner on an agreed basis
which is almost always 50-50 of the net. This arrange-
ment is dictated by the relatively high capital invest-
ment in modem machines, by the greater economies of
maintenance and servicing on a "route," and in the
case of amusement devices, by the need to rotate them
among locations to preserve novelty appeal.
"1Hannifin v. United States, 248 F.2d 173 (9th
Cir. 1957); United States v. Asani, 240 F.2d 216 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957); United States v.
Three Gambling Devices Known As Jokers, 161 F.
Supp. 5 (D. Pa. 1958).
2 Hoke v. Lawson, 175 Md. 246, 1 A.2d 77 (1938);
Robey v. Mantell, 175 Md. 690, 1 A.2d 82 (1938);
Boies v. Bartell, 82 Ariz. 217, 310 P.2d 834 (1957);
Adams v. Antonio, 88 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App.
1935); State v. Paul, 43 N.J. Super. 396, 128 A.2d 737
(1957).
23 See, e.g., Town of Centerville v. Burns, 174 Tenn.
435, 126 S.W.2d 322 (1939); State v. Abbott, 218 N.C.
470, 11 S.E.2d 539 (1940).
outcome, the machine cannot pay off in money,
as it would be emptied by the first skillful patron
who happened upon it.)
Despite all its ingenious proliferations, the
traditional slot machine was clearly on the wane
by the 1930's, 24 and slot gambling might not have
survived World War IF5 on any large scale had
not a newcomer made its appearance: the "marble
table" or pinball game.
The first pinballs, marketed around 1930, were
simple penny versions of the ancient parlor game
of bagatelle, allowing the player to shoot steel
balls into a glass-covered labyrinth where they
could drop into numbered holes indicating a cumu-
lative score. They proved popular, soon appearing
in more complicated table models, and with the
advent of electrification they evolved into the still-
familiar amusement machine characterized by an
illuminated backboard, complex play features, and
a surfeit of clanging bells, flashing lights, and bright
paint. This innovation also founded a substantial
industry, centering, as does most of the manu-
facture of coin devices, in the Chicago area.
In 1935 amusement pinball designers came up
with the invention which was to give gambling
manufacturers the new lease on life they sorely
needed. It was a simple invention, an adaptation
of the coin-receiving chute which reactivates the
game without another coin if the player achieves
a sufficiently high score, etc., so the machine can
automatically give one or more "free games" as a
play incentive. 6 And it was an instant success.
The possibility of winning an extra game or two-
thus extending the "amusement" feature of the
play-soon put the pinball game ahead of all its
competitors in the coin-operated amusement cate-
gories. Most courts, confronted with the question
whether a free game thus awarded was, per se, a
"thing of value," found in the negative, holding
the value to be de minimis or to be merely part of
the play given for the initial coin-consideration."
24 State v. Busch, 59 R.I. 382, 195 Atl. 487 (1937);
Miller v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 153 Wis. 431, 141
N.W. 263 (1913); Territory v. Jones, 14 N.M. 579,
99 Pac. 338 (1908); Meyer v. State, 112 Ga. 20, 37 S.E.
96 (1900).
2Because coin-machine manufacture requires un-
usually high standards of quality and durability, the
industry won a creditable profusion of production
"E's" when it switched, early and completely, to sup-
porting the national war effort in 1940-1945.
2" See, Chicago Patent Corp. v. Genco, Inc., 124
F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1941).
2See, e.g., Washington Coin Machine Ass'n v.
Callahan, 142 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Gayer v.
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So the free game amusement machine was gen-
erally acceptable to law enforcement agencies.
But the gamblers were not far behind. Most of
the attempted subterfuges noted in the foregoing
review had aimed at concealing the pay-off in one
way or another (i.e., of the three classic elements
it was easier to mask the prize than the con-
sideration or the chance), and now an adaptation
of the free game feature accomplished this with
unparalleled efficiency and accuracy. Into the
machine was built a "knock-off" circuit, activated
by a concealed button or some other hard-to-
detect control.28 The player could still play off the
games he won (and the sheriff could be shown that
this was a bona fide amusement feature); but if
the player elected to be paid off, the location
owner gave him cash and "knocked off" the games,
which simultaneously recorded each game thus
removed on a meter locked inside the machine,
beside the cash box.2 And observe what this ac-
complishes: the machine now gives nothing
directly (coin, token, ticket, merchandise, etc.)
which can be labeled a thing of value; yet when
the cash box is opened the location owner is re-
imbursed according to the meter, before the net
profit is divided; so the machine itself is thus
still controlling pay-offs, as accurately as if it had
dropped the winnings directly into each player's
hand.P
While amusement models give only one or two
Whelan, 59 Cal. App. 2d 255, 138 P.2d 763 (1943); In
re Wigton, 151 Pa. Super. 337, 30 A.2d 352 (1943);
State v. Waite, 156 Kan. 143, 131 P.2d 708 (1942).
21 On some later models disconnecting the line cord
trips the circuit, or the button is connected by incon-
spicuous wiring from some point away from the ma-
chine; or touching a coin or key to two bolt-heads on its
side or back serves the same purpose.
29 A recent substitute for the meter (which is some-
times disguised by use of two meters recording all
games won and all games played off, etc.) is the so-
called coin divider, which gives the location owner his
share of pay-offs by means of a separate cash box to
which he has access. In re Three Pinball Machines,
192 A.2d 240 (Pa. Super. 1963).
30 It must be noted that amusement pinball machines,
or any game or device operating with an element of
chance (see note 34 infra), may be used for betting
between two players or player and owner, and this is
indisputably gambling. But this does not make the
machine a gambling device or establish that it is designed
for gambling; if it did, Uncle Sam's heads-and-tails
coins would also fall under the stigma. The correct test
is always whether the machine somehow controls the
pay-off, as is being explained at this point in the text.
See, Johnson v. Phinney, 218 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1955);
Stoutamire v. Pratt, 148 Fla. 690, 5 So. 2d 248 (1941);
cf. State v. One 5 Fifth Inning Baseball Machine, 241
Ala. 455, 3 So. 2d 27 (1941).
free games per play, and accumulate no more than
ten or fifteen (at most, on any current model, 26),
the gambling versions will award, typically, up to
600 per play and will accumulate the limit of a
three-digit indicator, i.e., 999. And observe again:
this is no longer small-time gambling; on a 100
machine 999 games represent a pay-off of $99.90,
and the "win" on a single game can be $60.00.
Soon after this pay-off scheme, there came an-
other clever innovation designed to enlarge the
consideration, or "stake," that could be hazarded
on a single game. After the first coin drops the
balls, dears the preceding game score, lights the
backboard, and readies the machine for the pinball
play, so the player could proceed as if he were
patronizing an amusement game, he has another
option: he can drop additional coins-any num-
ber of additional coins, one by one-to try to
increase his odds in the event he wins. For example
on the standard "bingo" type, which pays off for
lighting 3, 4, or 5 numbers in a row on a simulated
bingo card, the initial odds would be 75 (for 5 in a
row), 16 (for 4), and 4 (for 3); dropping an ad-
ditional coin might or might not cause the odds to
advance to 75-20-6, or 96-24-8, and so forth.
Each coin so dropped activates an electrical chance
mechanism, precisely akin in function to the old
slot machine reels, . which never reduces the odds
already set but may or may not increase them. A







And each play of the odds-determining mechanism
is very fast. So once more observe: now the player
is invited to drop dozens or even hundreds of
nickels or dimes on a single play (in much less
time than he could play them through an old one-
armed bandit), for a chance to win at highest
odds. He may also, of course, gamble back the
"free games" he has already accumulated, one
by one, in the same manner.
Gambling operations on this scale made it eco-
nomically possible-if not essential-to equip the
machines with another feature that is now charac-
teristic, an expensive and complicated device
known as a "reflex unit," which operates con-
stantly to adjust the odds (unbeknownst to the
player) to protect the "house." After a series of
'IUnited States v. Five Gambling Devices, 252
F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1958).
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pay-offs the unit begins to disconnect circuits in
the odds-fixing mechanism, to reduce the chance of
increasing the odds with each coin; after a period
of slow play the unit reverses and reopens circuits
to make it progressively easier to win larger
amounts again.n
When these features are understood it is not hard
to see why the gambling manufacturers, although
desiring to simulate the appearance of amusement
pinball games, actually eschewed the complex and
time-consuming play aspects of the amusement
counterpart, and sought to minimize them. This
produced first the "one-ball" machine, scourge of
law enforcement in the early 'forties, wherein the
pinball play in each game was limited to shoot-
ing a single ball. When one-balls began to invoke
judicial disapproval,n the gambling industry
shifted to the bingo types, requiring the shooting
of five balls onto a simple play board containing
25 numbered holes, and this latter characteristic-
the 25-hole board without any play features except
pegs, spring bumpers, and some bright paint-still
identifies current gambling models. While it takes
two to three minutes to play a game on an amuse-
ment machine, the five-ball number determination,
i.e., the pinball play, on a gambling pinball game
can be accomplished in a few seconds.l
It has been generally acknowledged in contem-
porary studies of organized crime that the proceeds
of gambling play a large part in financing America's
criminal overlords and their empires. 35 But most
of the investigators have tended to concentrate
their attention on race-wire services, horse parlors,
2 In re Trombetta, 188 Pa. Super. 480, 149 A.2d 483
(1959); People v. Twelve Pinball Machines, Cir. Ct.
Stephenson Co., Ill., No. 59-160, Jan., 1960.
3 State v. Kilburn, 111 Mont. 400, 109 P.2d 113(1941); State v. Coats, 158 Ore. 122, 74 P.2d 1102(1938); People v. Gravenhorst, 32 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1942);
State v. Livingston, 135 Me. 323, 196 Afd. 407 (1938).
See Johnson v. Phinney, 218 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1955).
14It should be noted in passing that although the
point has often been argued, no American court has
ever been persuaded to hold that the gravity-motivated
descent of steel balls on a glass-covered incline can be
controlled solely by skill; though "gunching" and
"hulaing" may be conceded some effect, all such games
have an element of chance sufficient to categorize them
as gambling if the other components (consideration
and prize) are present. Some courts have noted the
presence of the "tilt" device, actually built in to protect
the machines from destructive abuse, as evidence of the
manufacturer's intent to minimize skill. See, e.g., In re
Three Pinball Machines, 192 A.2d. 240 (Pa. Super.,
1963).
11 Senate Special Comm. To Investigate Organized
Crime in Interstate Commerce, Third Interim Report,
S. RF-. No. 307, 81st Cong. 2-4 (May 1951).
the numbers racket, and other aspects, to the ex-
clusion of coin-machine operations.36 This was an
important oversight, particularly with reference to
the pinball operations of the 'forties and 'fifties. A
gambling pinball machine in a good location will
average $200-$300 profit per week (while its amuse-
ment counterpart at the same spot would produce
only $15-S25). Constructing loosely from known
production rates and an assumed average machine
life of five years, there have been something like
100,000 such machines operating at any one time,
until very recently, in the United States-a profit
volume of, say, $20 million per week, or $1 billion
per year. Moreover, coin devices of this type,
which automatically extract large profits from the
patronage attracted by someone else's enterprise,
lend themselves uniquely to "muscle" tactics in
placing machines and protecting routes and ter-
ritories.P
A few state jurisdictions recognized the gambling
pinball machine for what it was and outlawed it
forthwith.39 In some, the courts identified the free
game feature per se as the source of evil, and as a
result both gambling and amusement types were
proscribed. 4° But here and there the machines are
operating as this is being written, in areas of "toler-
ance" or quasi-legality, confused with their amuse-
ment prototypes or openly accepted by local law
enforcers!'
36Id., Final Report, S. REP. No. 725, 82nd Cong.
(Aug. 1951); Senate Comm. on Government Operations,
Gambling and Organized Crimne, S. REP. No. 1310,87th
Cong. (March 1962).
17 Cf. Anonymous, supra note 1, at 64-65, 66, 69.
"8 House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, Prohibiting the Transportation of Gambling De-
vices in Interstate Commerce, H.R. REPn. No. 1828, 87th
Cong. 16-18 (June 1962) (1962 U.S. CODE CONGRnS-
sioNAL SxRwvcE at 3809).
9 In re Sutton, 148 Pa. Super. 101, 24 A.2d 756
(1942); Hunter v. Mayor, etc., of Teaneck Twp., 128
N.J.L. 164, 24 A.2d 553 (1942); Krause v. Cleveland,
135 Ohio St. 43, 19 N.E.2d 159 (1939); Henry v. Kun-
ney, 280 Mich. 188, 273 N.W. 442 (1937); Common-
wealth v. Bowman, 267 Ky. 602, 102 S.W.2d 382
(1936); People v. Gravenhorst, 32 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1942).
10Farina v. Kelly, 147 Conn. 444, 162 A.2d 517,(1959); Westerhaus v. City of Cincinnati, 165 Ohio
St. 327, 135 N.E.2d 318 (1956); Baedero v. Caldwell,
156 Neb. 489, 56 N.W.2d 706 (1953); Middlemas v.
Strutz, 71 N.D. 186, 299 N.W. 589 (1941); Giomi v.
Chase, 97 N.M. 22, 132 P.2d 715 (1942); Steely v.
Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 554, 164 S.W.2d 977 (1942).
41 In Maryland, for instance, there are more federal
gambling device stamps outstanding in Baltimore
County (1571) on these devices than in Maryland's
four slot machine counties on slot machines (1127); and
Baltimore is not one of the counties exempted in any
way from the state's anti-gambling laws. See Brown
v. State, 210 Md. 301, 123 A.2d 324 (1956); Hunter v.
1964]
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The most effective curbs on coin gambling
machines42 have been imposed by Congress and
the federal government,4 but this is a long story,
with most of the action centered in recent chapters.
A federal stamp tax was first laid on coin-operated
devices in 1941, at the rate of $10 on amusement
types and S50 on gambling machines, the latter
described as, "so-called 'slot' machines which oper-
ate by means of insertion of a coin, token, or
similar object and which, by operation of the ele-
ment of chance, may deliver, or entitle the person
playing or operating the machine to receive cash,
premiums, merchandise or token."' ' This immedi-
ately struck at conventional slot machines, and
since the gambling-device returns were public
records, 45 local law enforcement agencies were often
embarrassed, though not always goaded into taking
action."6
At the outset the federal stamp tax (increased to
$100 in 1942, to S150 in 19.50, and to $250 in 1951,
see Act of Oct. 20, 1951, 65 Stat. 528) was assessed
against gambling pinball machines only when
revenue agents happened to observe an actual pay-
off being made," and since, as has been explained,
pay-offs were controlled by the location owner,
such cases were few. Besides, until the question
was resolved in 1957, in United Stales v. Korpan, 
4
doubt existed whether bingo pinball machines fell
within the definition, "so-called 'slot' machines,"
anyway." But after Korpan, the IRS became more
aggressive, insisting successfully that gambling-
State, 193 Md. 596, 69 A.2d 505 (1949). Cf. Zumbrun,
Maryland." A Law Enforcement Dilemma, 347 ANNALS
58 (1963).
42 Since the early 'forties one substantial segment of
the manufacturing industry has limited production to
bona fide amusement devices and has been conducting
an aggressive campaign to dissociate itself and its
products from the other.
43Though special notice should be given a few states
which have tied their licensing powers (over taverns,
restaurants, etc.) to the control of gambling and gam-
bling devices, e.g., Wis. STAT. §176.90 (1949); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 43, §185 (1955). Gaynor, Indirect Control of
Organized Crime Through Liquor License Procedure, 49 J.
CRust. L., C. & P.S. 65 (1958).
41 Act of Sept. 20, 1941, 55 Stat. 722, 26 U.S.C
§§4461-2.
45 I.R.C., 1939, §3275; I.R.C., 1954, §6107.
"1 One weakness which still inheres in this law is that
the tax and registration requirements fall on the loca-
tion owner, and seldom bring to light the machine
owner or operator who is actually the promoter of all
such coin-machine operations. See note 20 supra.
47 United States v. One Bally, etc., Machine, 144 F.
Supp. 930 (D. Tenn. 1953).
48 354 U.S. 271.
41 See United States v. Korpan, 237 F.2d 676 (7th
Cir. 1956), reversed, 354 U.S. 271 (1957).
adapted pinball machines were gambling devices
per se,5' and winning significant test cases in the
federal courts.-" A loophole in the statute, existing
by reason of the limitation to machines literally
operated by the insertion of a coin (which ac-
counted for a flood of remote-control "trade
booster" attachments from the industry), :2 was
closed in 1958. "-
Meanwhile Congress had also brought the
interstate commerce powers of the federal govern-
ment into play. One of the important antecedents
of the Kefauver Crime Committee was an Attorney
General's Conference on Organized Crime, con-
vened by Attorney General McGrath in February,
1950.N This study, though eclipsed when the Sen-
ate Committee appeared in the limelight, made
important findings about the bookmaking wire
services and about coin machine gambling, which
resulted in two bills, S. 3357 and S. 3358, intro-
duced in the 81st Congress by Senator Edwin
Johnson. The wire-service bill (S. 3358) got no-
where; S. 3357, however, after emasculating re-
vision by the House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee, passed as P. L. 906-81, and
became known as the Johnson Act."5 As originally
introduced, this measure would have banned all
coin gambling devices from interstate commerce,
except when shipped to jurisdictions where they
were lawful to operate. 56 When the House got
through with the Senate bill, the controlling defini-
tion of "gambling device" emerged as follows:
"(1) any so-called 'slot machine' or any other
machine or mechanical device an essential part of
which is a drum or reel with insignia thereon,
and (A) which when operated may deliver, as
the result of the application of an element of
chance, any money or property, or (B) by the
operation of which a person may become en-
titled to receive, as the result of the application
10 Rev. Ruls. 59-294, 60-102, 61-28.
5' United States v. Nine Gambling Devices, 59-2
U.S.T.C. 115,275 (S.D. Ill. 1957); Turner v. United
States, 62-1 U.S.T.C. 15,402 (D. Kan. 1962); Harvey
v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 80 (D. Ore. 1962); United
States v. One Bally "Barrel-O-Fun" Coin-Operated
Gambling Device, 224 F. Supp. 794 (D. Pa. 1963).
52 See note 21 supra.
53 Act of Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1304.
1 See Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, Transmission of Gambling Information,
Hearings on S. 3358, 81st Cong. 7-46 (April 17, etc.,
1950).
'5 Act of Jan. 2, 1951, 64 Stat. 1134, 15 U.S.C.
§1171 ff.51 See 1950 U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE,
81st Cong. at 4240.
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of an element of chance, any money or property;
or
(2) any machine or mechanical device de-
signed and manufactured to operate by means
of insertion of a coin, token, or similar object
and designed and manufactured so that when
operated it may deliver, as the result of the
application of an element of chance, any money
or property ...."57
Here again, the conventional one-armed bandit,
with its drums or reels and insignia, was struck
(the draftsman might almost as well have said
"cherries, lemons and bells"); but the language
invited evasion. It, too, required machines in
category "(2)" to be literally coin-operated,50 and
electric slot machines of the "console" type were
easily modified to substitute a disc-wiper-finger
arrangement in lieu of the forbidden drums5
And the Johnson Act left a clear "out" for
gambling pinball machines. With no drums or
reels, they fell outside category "(1)"; and note
that category "(2)," which otherwise grounds on
an impeccable generic definition of gambling, re-
quires the machine to "deliver... money or prop-
erty." By omitting the additional phrase "by the
operation of which a person may become entitled
to receive" in this latter definition, the 1951 con-
gressional draftsmen virtually wrote a licensing
provision for all machines which made use of the
free game pay-off subterfuge. There were also
technical deficiencies in the record and registration
sections of the 1951 Act which made it cumbersome
and very difficult to apply."0
The chief weakness in this law-the omission
of indirect pay-offs in category "(2)" was per-
ceived at once, and a remedial amendment was
among the Kefauver Committee's legislative
proposals (S. 1624, 82nd Congress),61 endorsed as
early as 1951 by the American Bar Association
- 15 U.S.C. §1172.
18 Cf. United States v. 24 Digger Merchandising
Machines, 202 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 998 (1953); United States v. Three Trade Boosters,
135 F. Supp. 24 (D. Pa. 1955).
19 United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 252 F.2d
210 (7th Cir. 1958); Hannifin v. United States, 248
F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1957); United States v. One Elec-
tronic Pointmaker, 149 F. Supp. 427 (D. Ind. 1957);
United States v. McManus, 138 F. Supp. 164 (D. Wyo.
1956).
'0 United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S.
441 (1953); United States v. Asani, 240 F.2d 216 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957); United States v.
Five Gambling Devices, 119 F. Supp. 641 (D. Ga. 1954).
61 Final Report, supra note 36, at 89.
and other groups. 2 But it failed of passage. Bills
for the same purpose were introduced in every
subsequent Congress," including, after 1958, ad-
ministration-sponsored amendments to the regis-
tration sections.el But these seldom moved even as
far as the hearing stage.
In 1959 the McClellan Committee rekindled
interest in coin-machine gambling when it began
exposing tie-ins with labor racketeers and in 1961
an effective revision of the Johnson Act became
one of Attorney General Kennedy's important
anti-crime proposals,66 introduced by Senator
Eastland as S. 1658, 87th Congress, and enacted
October 18, 1962.6 Supporting the bill. Assistant
Attorney General Miller stated:
"The slot machine and pinball machine
gambling industry remains one of the mainstays
of organized crime. Racketeers have infiltrated
to a greater or lesser extent all phases of the
industry, including manufacturing, distribution,
ownership of the machines, and ownership of
the locations where the machines are placed.
Primarily because of the inhibitory effect of the
Johnson Act on the interstate distribution of
slot machines, the racketeers have focussed
their efforts largely upon developing pinball
machines as gambling devices. That the con-
version from slot machines to pinball machines
has been successful can be inferred from the
statement of many racketeers themselves that
the play on pinball machines is faster and more
profitable than it was on slot machines."'
Attorney General Kennedy pointed out:
"Some 'pinball' machines now in use afford
players an opportunity to register greater
numbers of free games and on which they can
manipulate odds and numbers of free games to
be scored. If certain combinations are achieved,
free games can be played off or eliminated from
the register by pressing a button or lever. The
pay-off is then made indirectly." 9
62 76 A.B.A. REP. 386, 408 (1951).
61E.g., S. 3190, 9456, 83rd Cong.; H.R. 792, 84th
Cong.; H.R. 252, 85th Cong.; S. 2107, 86th Cong.
E.g., S. 2206, 86th Cong.
65 Senate Select Comm. on Improper Activities in
the Labor or Management Field, Investigation, etc.,
Hearings, Part 46, at 16511-88 (Feb. 10, etc., 1959).
66 Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, The Attorney Gen-
eral's Program To Curb Organized Crine and Racketeer-
ing, Hearings on S. 1653, etc., 87th Cong. at 13, 20, 25,
62 e passin (June 6, etc., 1961).
61 P.L. 87-840, 76 Stat. 1075, 15 U.S.C. §1171-8.61 H. REP. No. 1828, 87th Cong., supra note 38 at 16.69House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
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This measure70 has already withstood a con-
stitutional challenge,7' and promises effectively to
restrain interstate traffic in gambling devices of
the pinball type as well as other coin-gambling
machines.7' It contains new registration and
record-keeping requirements, expressly proscribes
any falsification of record entries, and authorizes
the inspection of records by agents of the FBI.73
The "coin-operated" loophole is eliminated, 4 and
indirect pay-offs are caught by the incorporation
in subsection (a)(2) of §1171 the phrase, "by the
operation of which, etc." formerly appearing only
in subsection (a)(1). Amusement-type machines,
including specifically bona fide amusement devices
in the free game category, are exempted 5
The Act excludes manufacture and shipment for
export from its prohibitions, 7 6 but not from its
record-keeping sections. The original Johnson Act
exclusion, for any state "which has enacted a law
providing for the exemption of such State" is
retained (a most unusual drafting device, requiring
positive action by state lawmakers to alter the
federal pattern--and with which only Nevadan has
so far complied). But there is also a new provision
exempting transportation of gambling devices:
".... into any State in which the transported
gambling device is specifically enumerated as
lawful in a statute of that State."3 '
And this suggests that pressure may again be
generated in state legislatures for innocuous-sound-
ing language 9 which will fulfill this requirement."0
merce, Gambling Devices, Hearings on H.R. 3024, etc.
87th Cong. at 10 (Jan. 16, etc., 1962).
7' Gambling Devices Act of 1962, 15 U.S.C. §1171-8,
as amended.
7 Lion Mfg. Corp. v. Kennedy, D.D.C. No. 3891-62,
Jan. 11, 1963, agf'd, - F.2d -- (D.C. Cir. 1964), leave
to file pet. for mandamus denied sub nom. Lion Mfg.
Corp. v. Maguire, 373 U.S. 920 (1963).
72 Another of Attorney General Kennedy's anti-
crime proposals, the Interstate Travel Act, enacted
Sept. 13, 1961 (P.L. 87-228, 75 Stat. 498, 18 U.S.C.
§1952) has also proved effective in dealing with gam-
bling devices. See United States v. Michael Distribut-
ing Co., W.D. Wash., Crim. No. 50-688 (1963).
15 U.S.C. §1173.
- 15 U.S.C. §1171.
76 15 U.S.C. §1178.
76 15 U.S.C. §1172. Cf., 15 U.S.C. §§1171(d), 1173.
and see note 81, infra.
,'Nevada Laws, 1951, ch. 97, p. 13. Cf., United
States v. 46 Gambling Devices, 138 F. Supp. 896 (D.
Md. 1956); United States v. Two Hollycrane Slot Ma-
chines, 136 F. Supp. 550 (D. Mass., 1955).
15 U.S.C. §1172.
79 Cf. La. Acts, 1962, No. 361, and Wash. Laws, 1963,
ch. 37.
0 The power-if not the sound judgment-of gam-
bling proponents in the State of Washington was
Or manufacture and distribution may be decen-
tralized to confine the production of gambling
machines to intrastate areas, as happened a few
years ago when Maryland became a large enough
slot machine market to induce one of the slots
companies to forsake Chicago and relocate in a
small Maryland town."1
Typical of the difficulties encountered by state
and local jurisdictions in curbing coin-machine
gambling is the recent experience of Illinois, where
gambling pinball revenues have been estimated to
be running as high as $25-$30 millions per year."
Under Illinois' 1895 slot machine Act'13 it was held,
in 1942, that all free game machines were illegal.4
In 1953 the Illinois General Assembly was induced,
for the avowed purpose of legalizing bona fide
amusement machines, to amend the law by exempt-
ing:
"A coin-in-the-slot operated mechanical device
played for amusement which rewards the player
with the right to replay such mechanical device,
which device is so constructed or devised as to
make such result of the operation thereof depend
in part upon the skill of the player and which
returns to the player thereof no coins, tokens or
merchandise." (Emphasis added)."
This language was interpreted in 1957 to include,-
i.e., to exempt-pay-off pinball machines,"5 by a
Court which did not have a clear description of
the features of the machine before it."
Note that the statutory language underscored
in the Illinois exemption above is deficient in pre-
demonstrated when 82,955 petition signatures (48,630
required) to put the latter Act to a referendum "van-
ished" from the State Capitol Building safe. Secretary
of State Myers certified the validity of the signatures
anyway, and the matter is now pending in the State
Supreme Court. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Oct. 29,
1963, p. 5.
"1 Cook, Gambling, Inc.-Treasure Chest of the Under-
world, Nation, Oct. 22, 1960, pp. 308-09. The 1962
amendments (15 U.S.C. §§1171(e), 1173) require
registration and records pertaining to intrastate sales,
etc., of gambling devices; but prohibitory controls are
not imposed-and might be unconstitutional. See
United States v. Denmark, 119 F. Supp. 647 (D. Ga.),
aff'd, 346 U.S. 441 (1953); United States v. 65 Slot
Machines, 102 F. Supp. 922 (D. La., 1952).
2Chicago Sun-Times, March 19, 1963, p. 16.
"Laws, 1895, p. 156, §1. See Bobel v. People, 173 Ill.
19, 50 N.E. 322 (1898).
"People v. One Pinball Machine, 316 Ill. App. 161,
44 N.E.2d 950.
8" Laws, 1953, p. 929, §1.
"6 People v. One Mechanical Device, 1 Ill. 2d 107,
142 N.E.2d 98 (1957).
87 Cf. People v: Twelve Pinball Machines, Cir. Ct.
Stephenson Co., No. 59-160, Jan. 11, 1960.
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cisely the same way as was the Johnson Act,
namely, by omitting reference to indirect pay-offs.
Three efforts were made by the General Assembly
to close this loophole: in 1959, when a bill passed
nearly unanimously by both Houses was vetoed;"8
in 1961 when the measure, after passing one House,
was scuttled by amendment in the other in the
dosing hours of a hectic session;" and finally, in
1963, when a bill reached Governor Kerner's desk
and was signed.10 The loophole-closing amendment,
merely substituting "no money, property or right
to receive noney or property" for the deficient phrase,
is now being tested in the Illinois courts (while
the gambling machines run on, under an injunc-
tion.)9' Efforts to control the manufacture of gam-
bling machines in the Chicago area were never
successful,92 and the 1962 amendment legalizes the
remnants of the manufacturing industry in Illi-
nois-m (on the not unreasonable theory that Chicago
need not be deprived of the income, jobs, etc.,
generated by production, so long as distribution
is confined to markets where the machines are not
outlawed by local public policy.)14
At this writing coin-machine gambling in the
United States is doubtless at low ebb. Latest
IRS figures (fiscal 1962-1963) show 31,827 federal
1, Veto message by Governor Stratton, July 24, 1959:
"This Bill would distinguish between coin-operated
amusement devices as to the manner in which a replay
is permitted, classifying one group as gambling devices
and the other not.... The objects sought by this Bill
can ... be fully accomplished by local authorities
without arbitrarily giving preference to one type of
amusement device and banning a similar type."
89 72d G.A., S. 137, S. 138.
,0 73d G.A., H.B. 374 (with 27 sponsors) and S. 388
(with 4 sponsors), amending ILL. CRnI. CODE, 1961,
§28-2, signed July 8, 1963. Laws, 1963, p. 1413.
91 White v. Ogilvie, Cir. Ct. Cook Co., Il., No. 63-S-
17086 (1963).
2 See, Hershey Mfg. Co. v. Adamowski, 22 Ill. 2d
36, 174 N.E.2d 200 (1961).
"See ILL. Cram. CODE, 1961, §28-1 (Laws, 1961, p
1983, §35-1) as amended by Laws, 1963, p. 1412.
N Similar considerations prompted Congress to re-
ject Attorney General Kennedy's request for a ban on
shipments of gambling devices into foreign markets.
See Hearings, note 61 supra, at 7, and H.R. REP. No.
1828, supra note 38, at 4.
stamps outstanding on coin-gambling devices, and
at least half of these are believed to be on "in
line" pinball games which will be further restricted
by enforcement of the Eastland Act. Even if the
new New Hampshire lottery law" and current ex-
pressions of the "let's-legalize-all-gambling" senti-
ment" mark a trend, coin-machines shoudd be the
last of all commercial gambling operations to be
revived, for they are purely exploitative, unsuited
to the furtherance of worthy causes, and not even
related to improvement in the breeding of horses
and dogs. They aim at the meager pocket-money
of the poor and have none of the patrician aura
sometimes associated with race tracks, Jai Alai
emporiums, or plush gambling casinos.
Whether there will be a renaissance in this field
is not so easy to predict, however. England has
recently permitted the operation of slots and other
pay-off devices, with certain limitations as to odds
and total stakes per play." Other European coun-
tries have developed boom markets, with Ger-
man and Japanese manufacturers offering the
American industry brisk competition. On the home
front, the Chicago company which monopolized
the production of gambling pinball machines in
recent years has changed hands, passing into the
control of a New York group and reviving its
line of "in line" devices. And if law enforcement is
indeed nearly abreast of today's subterfuges, his-
tory suggests that we can fairly look for something
new tomorrow:
"In no field of reprehensible endeavor has
the ingenuity of man been more exerted than in
the invention of devices to comply with the
letter, but to do violence to the spirit and thwart
the beneficient objects and purposes, of the laws
designed to suppress the vice of gambling 98
"5 N.H. REv. STAT. Ai'N. 284:21a-k, Laws 1963,
ch. 52.
96 See, e.g., Breslin, In Defense of Gambling, Sat. Eve.
Post, Jan. 5, 1963, p. 12.
"Betting and Gaming Act, 8 Eliz. 2 (1959).
98 Moberly v. Deskin, 169 Mo. App. 672, 155 S.W.2d
842, 844 (1913).
